Vehicle History

AAAV (EFV): The Marine Vehicle Cancelled in 2011

By AAAV Published · Updated

AAAV stands for Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle, the U.S. Marine Corps program to replace the 1970s Assault Amphibious Vehicle (AAV) with a tracked vehicle that could leave a ship 25 miles offshore, skim to the beach at 20 knots or more and fight alongside tanks. General Dynamics Land Systems built the prototypes. The program was renamed the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) on 10 September 2003, failed its 2006 operational assessment, breached the Nunn-McCurdy cost limits in 2007 and was cancelled in 2011: Defense Secretary Robert Gates announced on 6 January that he would recommend ending it, and the Pentagon’s acquisition chief directed the cancellation on 16 February. No EFV ever entered service. By Gates’s count the Pentagon had spent more than $3 billion on development and faced another $12 billion to build the fleet, according to the Congressional Research Service.

Quick facts

ItemAAAV / EFV
RoleArmored amphibious infantry carrier; replacement for the AAV
Prime contractorGeneral Dynamics Land Systems (Woodbridge, Virginia)
VariantsEFV-P1 personnel carrier (17 Marines, crew of three) and EFV-C1 command vehicle
Armament (P1)Stabilized 30 mm Mk44 Bushmaster cannon and coaxial 7.62 mm M240 machine gun
Water speed requirement (2007)Threshold 20 knots, objective 25 knots, for at least one continuous hour in 2-foot significant wave height
Launch distanceAbout 25 nautical miles offshore (the AAV: about 2 miles)
Land speed requirement (2007)Threshold 69 km/h, objective 72 km/h on hard-surface roads (about 43 to 45 mph)
Land range and mobility345 miles ashore (CRS, 2011); mobility comparable to the M1A1/2 tank (Pentagon test director, 2006)
WeightAbout 80,000 pounds in Gates’s 2011 description; Army Technology lists 34,473 kg (about 76,000 pounds) fully loaded
Renamed10 September 2003
EndedAnnounced 6 January 2011; cancellation directed 16 February 2011
BuiltPrototypes only; GAO’s 2010 briefing counts 19 development vehicles in the fiscal 2011 budget

The specifications come from the CRS report on the EFV, the Pentagon test director’s fiscal 2006 annual report, Army Technology’s program profile and the GAO’s July 2010 review; the speed requirements come from a 2007 program briefing to the National Defense Industrial Association.

The requirement: over the horizon at planing speed

The AAV entered Marine service in 1972. A 1988 Mission Area Analysis judged it deficient in water and land speed, firepower, armor protection and survivability, according to a Marine Corps News story from the 2003 renaming ceremony. The AAV, which can be launched only about 2 miles from shore according to CRS, keeps an amphibious task force close to the beach during a landing. The Assault Amphibious Vehicle guide covers that vehicle’s own history.

The Marines wanted the opposite: ships beyond the horizon and a vehicle fast enough to cover the distance quickly. CRS describes the EFV as designed to launch 25 miles offshore, against 2 miles for the AAV, “permitting the fleet to operate ‘over the horizon,’ where it theoretically would be less vulnerable to enemy fire.” The October 2007 program briefing puts the standoff at “25 nm and beyond”.

Doing that in a vehicle that also had to fight ashore forced an unusual design. The key performance parameters in the 2007 briefing set high water speed at a threshold of 20 knots and an objective of 25 knots for at least one continuous hour in 2-foot significant wave height. Reaching those speeds meant lifting the hull onto a plane, with a retractable suspension, a hydrodynamic bow flap and waterjets. Army Technology’s program profile describes a planing aluminium hull, a dual-use MTU MT883 diesel rated at 2,702 horsepower in water mode and 850 horsepower on land, and counter-rotating 23-inch Honeywell waterjets; the mechanics are explained in the guide to how waterjets work. Gates summed up the result at a January 2011 Pentagon briefing: an “80,000-pound armored vehicle that skims the surface of the ocean for long distances at high speeds before transitioning to combat operations on land.”

Each of those requirements pulled against the others. GAO recorded that trouble meeting the weight limit led the Marines to reduce the high-speed sea-state requirement from 3 feet to 2 feet of significant wave height, propose dropping integrated nuclear, biological and chemical protection and cut the required land range after landing. A V-shaped hull, which deflects mine blasts, was considered but rejected as impractical because it would compromise the vehicle’s required performance, per the same GAO briefing.

Dated milestones

DateEventSource
1972AAV enters serviceMarine Corps News, 2003
1988Mission Area Analysis finds AAV deficient; concept phase begins for the AAAVMarine Corps News; CRS
1995Program Definition and Risk Reduction (PDRR) phase begins; during it the program wins two DoD awards for cost and technology managementCRS
June 1996General Dynamics Land Systems wins the contract to develop its designCRS
December 2000Program, still called the AAAV, enters System Development and Demonstration (SDD)GAO-06-349
July 2001Cost-plus SDD contract awarded; completion planned for October 2003CRS
November 2002 and March 2003First two rebaselines, each adding 12 monthsGAO-06-349
10 September 2003AAAV renamed EFV at a ceremony in Woodbridge, VirginiaMarine Corps News
September to December 2004Bow flap problems, then hull electronics unit failures freeze water steeringCRS
January 2005Reliability requirement cut from 70 to 43.5 hours mean time between operational mission failuresGAO-06-349
March 2005Third rebaseline, adding 24 monthsGAO-06-349
May 2006GAO warns reliability will not be demonstrated until fiscal 2010GAO-06-349
2006Operational Assessment 1 (OA-1) failsCRS; GAO-10-758R
February 2007Navy notifies Congress of a critical Nunn-McCurdy breach (6 February); sources-sought notice for alternative designsCRS; GAO-10-758R; NDIA briefing
March 2007$143.5 million added to General Dynamics’ contract to redesignCRS
June 2007Program certified to Congress (5 June) and restructured; SDD repeated as SDD-2NDIA briefing; GAO-10-758R
Mid-2008SDD-2 contract awarded (July according to GAO, August according to CRS)GAO-10-388SP; CRS
December 2008Critical design review passedCRS
17 April 2009Gates asks whether a new ship-to-shore capability is neededCRS
2 July 2010GAO-10-758R recommends reevaluating the business caseGAO
6 January 2011Gates announces recommendation to cancelCRS
16 February 2011Under Secretary Ashton Carter directs cancellation; no FY2012 fundingGAO
February 2011Marines issue three requests for information to industry, for AAV upgrades and an EFV successorCRS

The 2003 renaming

The change came at a ceremony at General Dynamics’ Worth Avenue Technology Center in Woodbridge on 10 September 2003, reported by Marine Corps News. In his speech Lt. Gen. Emil Bedard, the Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies and Operations, said the Corps’ focus, on amphibious operations in the 20th century, was shifting to expeditionary operations in the 21st; the story presented the new name as a reflection of that cultural change. The vehicle itself did not change: “AAAV” and “EFV” are two names for one program, and documents before September 2003 use the first.

Why it failed: reliability, weight and schedule

The program had a strong start. CRS notes that it was seen as a “model defense acquisition program” in the 1990s. Then the system development phase, planned to finish in October 2003, ran into what GAO called a schedule that “proved too short”: the original plan of about three years did not allow adequate time to test, evaluate the results, fix the problems and retest. Three rebaselines between November 2002 and March 2005 added a total of four years, per GAO-06-349. In the same period the reliability requirement, measured as mean time between operational mission failures, was cut from 70 hours to 43.5, a change approved in January 2005.

The 2006 operational assessment exposed the gap. Citing the Marine Corps test agency, GAO said the program had anticipated 17 hours of mean time between operational mission failure but achieved 4.5. CRS adds that vehicles needed about 3.4 hours of corrective maintenance for each hour of operation, logged 117 operational mission failures and 645 unscheduled maintenance actions, and completed 2 of 11 attempted amphibious tests, 1 of 10 gunnery tests and none of 3 land mobility tests. The prototypes were about 1,900 pounds too heavy to reach the desired water speed.

GAO-10-758R traced the reliability problem to the vehicle’s complexity. Program management, the Army’s analysts and an independent expert review team had come to see the EFV as closer to a helicopter than to the AAV or other ground vehicles on which its projected reliability growth was based, and an independent Navy review identified the hydraulic systems as a significant contributor. Cold-weather tests showed ice buildup that limited visibility and interfered with communications.

The 2007 breach and restructuring

In February 2007 the program reported a critical unit-cost breach under the Nunn-McCurdy provisions, then codified at 10 U.S.C. 2433 and 2433a, which required the Department of Defense to report the cost growth to Congress and, for a critical breach, to reassess the program and certify it before it could continue. The October 2007 program briefing dates the Navy Secretary’s notification to 6 February 2007 and the acquisition under secretary’s certification of the program to Congress to 5 June 2007. In the month of the breach the program office also asked industry for information on alternative tracked designs. In June 2007 the Marines decided to repeat the whole development phase, a step that a 2008 House Oversight Committee majority staff report, quoted by CRS, called “the largest program setback”: SDD would now finish in 2011, eight years after the original date.

The redesign, SDD-2, hired additional engineers, enlisted experts from the Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity and ordered seven new prototypes, expected to carry almost 400 engineering design improvements. It passed its critical design review in December 2008. CRS noted that a lighter Army linked track then under research could have saved about 800 pounds. By July 2010 GAO found that the restructured effort had raised development costs only 2.5% and procurement only 3.5% since 2007, but warned that the assumed reliability growth curve might be optimistic and that the true growth rate might not become fully apparent until the initial operational test.

Planned versus actual

Table 1 of GAO’s July 2010 briefing compares two estimates of the program, both in constant fiscal 2011 dollars: the one made at development start in December 2000 and the one in the fiscal 2011 President’s Budget.

Measure (GAO-10-758R, fiscal 2011 dollars)December 2000 estimate (development start)Fiscal 2011 President’s Budget estimateChange
Development cost$1,625.2 million$3,781.4 million+132.7%
Procurement cost$7,299.8 million$10,549.4 million+44.5%
Total program acquisition cost$9,018.7 million$14,429.4 million+60.0%
Program unit cost$8.8 million$24.3 million+176.5%
Average procurement unit cost$7.2 million$18.4 million+155.1%
Development quantity1219+7
Procurement quantity1,013574-43%
Planned full-rate production200 a year55 a year-73%

The schedule and requirement changes come from other reports, each with its own date:

MeasureOriginalRevisedWhen, and source
SDD completionOctober 20032011June 2007 restructuring, eight years late (CRS)
Reliability requirement (mean time between operational mission failures)70 hours43.5 hoursCut approved January 2005 (GAO-06-349)
Reliability in the 2006 operational assessment (OA-1)17 hours expected at that stage4.5 hours achievedGAO-10-758R, citing the Marine Corps test agency
Sea state for high-speed transit3 ft significant wave height2 ftReported July 2010 (GAO-10-758R)

The percentage changes in the cost and unit-cost rows are GAO’s own; the quantity changes are calculated from GAO’s figures. In the same report, GAO’s evaluation of the Defense Department’s comments adds that when procurement was cut from 1,013 to 574 vehicles, the planned full-rate production rate fell from 120 to 55 a year. On reliability, the 43.5-hour requirement is 38 percent below the original 70 hours, and the 4.5 hours achieved in OA-1 was about a quarter of what the program expected at that stage and about a tenth of the requirement.

Two caveats govern the cost numbers. They are in constant fiscal 2011 dollars, so they cannot be compared directly with figures from other years or on other bases. GAO’s May 2006 report, for example, put total acquisition cost at $12.6 billion, up about $3.9 billion or 45 percent since December 2000; restated in constant 2006 dollars, it said, the rise was $3.1 billion, or 32 percent. And GAO noted in 2010 that the vast majority of the cost growth occurred before the 2007 breach.

Unit cost is the clearest signal. Program unit cost divides total acquisition cost by every vehicle planned, development and production together: $8.8 million across 1,025 vehicles at development start (12 plus 1,013, the same total CRS gives for the original plan) and $24.3 million across 593 vehicles (19 plus 574) in the fiscal 2011 budget. CRS’s “about $24 million apiece” comes from GAO’s March 2010 assessment, which put program unit cost at $24.1 million in fiscal 2010 dollars. Cutting the quantity while redesign costs grew made each vehicle nearly three times as expensive.

Cancellation

On 6 January 2011 Gates announced that, on the recommendation of the Navy Secretary and the Marine Corps Commandant, he would recommend terminating the EFV. At a Pentagon news briefing that day, in remarks CRS quotes from the Defense Department transcript, he said the EFV “has already consumed more than $3 billion to develop, and will cost another $12 billion to build,” for a fleet able to put 4,000 troops ashore, and that fully executing it “would essentially swallow the entire Marine vehicle budget, and most of its total procurement budget for the foreseeable future.” He added that recent Navy and Marine Corps analysis suggested the most plausible scenarios could be handled by a mix of existing air and sea systems and new vehicles, and that the decision “does not call into question the Marines’ amphibious assault mission.”

Two threads preceded the decision. In April 2009 Gates had told the Naval War College he wanted the Quadrennial Defense Review to examine the need for a new ship-to-shore capability and asked “how much amphibious capability do we need?” The over-the-horizon idea was also contested on its own terms: CRS cited the 2006 Hezbollah C-802 missile strike, in which one missile hit an Israeli warship about 10 miles from shore and another hit an Egyptian ship 36 miles out, to question whether 25 miles still protected the fleet.

The formal order followed. GAO’s follow-up record says that on 16 February 2011 Ashton Carter, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, directed that the program be cancelled and not funded in the fiscal 2012 budget, because it was considered unaffordable. The Marines estimated termination at about $185 million.

General Dynamics argued for a smaller buy instead: 200 EFVs (184 operational and 16 for training) in place of 573, which it said would save $6 billion against the cost of termination, AAV upgrades and a new vehicle. Some members of Congress opposed the cancellation and urged that EFV technology be harvested for a successor, per CRS. The proposal was not adopted.

What the EFV left behind

The requirement survived. GAO’s follow-up record notes that the ship-to-shore requirement was not cancelled and that an analysis of alternatives began for a proposed Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV), the successor that CRS records was first called the New Amphibious Assault Vehicle. Gates also committed funds to upgrade the AAV fleet. GAO’s 2010 briefing records that 1,063 AAVs had been rebuilt to standard and that the Marines planned to keep the AAV as the primary platform until at least 2015 and in service until 2025. The assault amphibious vehicle guide follows the AAV through that extended life.

The successor deliberately asked for less. The Marines’ February 2011 request for information, summarized by CRS, called for a vehicle that could deliver a 17-Marine squad from 12 miles or more offshore at not less than 8 knots in 1-foot seas, compared with the EFV’s 25 nautical miles and 20-to-25-knot requirement. The Marines first shelved the wheeled Marine Personnel Carrier in 2013, then revived it in 2014 as ACV Increment 1.1. On 19 June 2018 they selected BAE Systems to produce it, with an initial $198 million contract for 30 low-rate vehicles. The Marine Corps approved the ACV’s initial operational capability on 13 November 2020, and the Navy’s acquisition chief approved full-rate production on 8 December 2020, according to Marine Corps Systems Command’s fielding report. As of November 2026, a CRS In Focus updated on 6 October 2026 says the original acquisition objective of 1,122 vehicles was reduced under Force Design, lists 608 planned across four variants and reports that the fiscal 2027 request reflects “a pre-planned end to Amphibious Combat Vehicle procurement”; the ACV guide covers the variants and contracts.

GAO recorded the program’s lessons twice. In 2006 it recommended delaying the production decision until design and production maturity were shown and urged the Defense Department to teach the EFV experience at the Defense Acquisition University, naming points such as: reaching one knowledge point does not guarantee the next, a sound business case is needed for each phase, a critical design review must come at the right time and sufficient time must be allowed to learn from testing. The 2010 review made the same case for reliability: more than one operational assessment, a production decision delayed until reliability growth is shown and low-rate production kept to the minimum. GAO also observed that the 96 low-rate vehicles then planned were 17 percent of a 574-vehicle buy, against 101 vehicles, just under 10 percent, at the start of development, and that DoD policy requires a documented rationale above 10 percent.

The totals quoted for the program differ because each has its own date and basis: $12.6 billion for the whole program in GAO’s May 2006 report; $14.4 billion in constant fiscal 2011 dollars in its July 2010 briefing; $11.2 billion in fiscal 2010 dollars still needed from fiscal 2010 to field 573 production vehicles in its March 2010 assessment, the figure CRS cites; and Gates’s rounded January 2011 figures, more than $3 billion spent on development and another $12 billion to build, which stated no dollar basis. A figure is only meaningful with its source, year and basis.

Sources